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STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintif !-Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 
ROBERT "BUDDY" WASHINGTON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
12088 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The appellant, Robert "Buddy" Washington, appeals 
from a judgment on a jury verdict of guilty to a charge 
of receiving stolen property having a value in excess of 
fifty dollars ($50.00) and being an habitual criminal, ren-
dered in the Second Judicial District in and for Weber 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Dallas H. Young, 
Judge, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was charged by information with receiv-
ing stolen property having a value in excess of fifty dollars 
($50.00) and being an habitual criminal. The jury found 
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Robert "Buddy" "Vashington guilty on both charges and 
he was sentenced by the court to a term in the Utah State 
Prison not to exceed five years on the charge of receiving 
stolen goods, and a term of not less than fifteen years on 
the charge of being an habitual criminal, said terms to be 
served concurrently. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the decision of the District 
Court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In the fall of 1969 a series of burglaries were reported 
to the Ogden Police Department. Among the items listed 
as stolen from the different homes were the following: 
1. A polaroid camera which cost $225.00 new; 
2. A persian lamb coat which was purchased at 
Z.C.M.I. for $550.00; 
3. A black and white television set valued at $60.00; 
4. A color television set valued at approximately 
$400.00; 
5. An electric hair dryer valued at $23.79; 
6. A pendant watch; 
7. A shot gun. 
About the same time Miss Shirley Owens (or Shirley 
Gallegos, hereinafter referred to as Shirley Owens) testi-
fied that the appellant and three of his friends brought 
some items to her house (T. 65, 82). Among the items 
brought were a colored and a black and white television set, 
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,; 
a persian lamb coat, 2 rifles, a pendant watch and a hair 
dryer (T. 65). Shirley Owens asked the appellant where 
he got these items but he refused to tell her (T. 70). Ap-
pellant also went over to Mr. and Mrs. Lester Hall who 
lived in the duplex opposite Shirley and asked them if they 
would be interested in purchasing some items (T. 43). Mr. 
Hall purchased a couple of rifles (T. 43). Then appellant 
brought over a polaroid camera and a radio (T. 57). Mr. 
Hall purchased the polaroid camera and the appellant gave 
him the radio (T. 59). Later that night the appellant sold 
Mrs. Hall a colored television set and asked her to pick it 
up at Shirley Owens' place (T. 57). The appellant ex-
plained that he was leaving town and wanted to sell those 
items (T. 48). A black persian lamb coat was given by 
Miss Owens to Mrs. Hall (T. 71). However, Shirley Owens 
kept the hair dryer brought in by the appellant and his 
friends (T. 69). 
Ten days later police officers Balls and Buzick picked 
up all the items either sold or given by the appellant to Mr. 
and Mrs. Hall, Shirley Owens and Mr. McClellan (T. 92-
96). [Mr. McClellan had agreed to store the colored tele-
vision set for Mrs. Hall.] All items picked up were identi-
fied by the victims of the aforementioned burglaries as be-
longing to them. 
Mr. Howard Wade testified that he is the owner of 
Exhibit "A", the polaroid camera (T. 4, 5). C. W. Hortman 
testified that he owned Bxhibit "B", a black persian lamb 
jacket (T. 11). Exhibit "C" which appellant brought to 
Shirley was identified by Dale Iverson as his black and 
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white television set (T. 16). Virginia Chase claimed own-
ership of Exhibits "D" and "E" which were a Westinghouse 
radio and pendant watch respectively (T. 23, 26). Mrs. 
Muriel Hardy testified that the color television set, Exhibit 
"I", the antique gun, Exhibit "G", and the hair dryer, Ex-
hibit "H", all belonged to her (T. 32, 33). The total value 
of all assets brought to Shirley Owens and Mr. and Mrs. 
Hall by Buddy Washington when new, except for the an-
tique gun and pendant watch (which were hard to value), 
was over twelve hundred and sixty-five dollars ($1265.00). 
The appellant claims a Mrs. Hussy wanted him to sell 
those items to post bail for her husband (T. 115), and that, 
contrary to Shirley Owens' testimony, Mrs. Hussy and an-
other person, and not himself, took the stolen items to 
Shirley Owens' house (T. 124). However, testimony and 
evidence were introduced to impeach the appellant's testi-
mony. The evidence was Mr. Howard Wade's credit card 
taken from appellant's person in Wyoming and also some 
credit slips with Howard Wade's forged name and appel-
lant's address. The credit cards were taken from Mr. 
Wade's home along with the polaroid camera. There was 
also testimony that appellant was wearing shoes exactly 
the same as those stolen from the Chase home ( T. 26, 27) . 
After a full trial the jury found appellant guilty of 
possession of stolen goods in excess of fifty dollars 
($50.00), pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-38-1~ (1953). 
Trial was then continued on appellant's second charge, 
to-wit: that appellant is an habitual criminal in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. ~ 76-1-18 (1953). Mr. James W. Johnson 
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employed as a records and identification officer at the Utah 
State Prison (T. 143), brought copies of the commitments, 
Exhibits 1 and 2. The commitments showed Buddy Wash-
ington was committed on two different occasions to the 
Utah State Prison (T. 149, 150). The jury found the ap-
pellant guilty of being in the status of an habitual criminal 
and the court then set a time for sentencing er. 157, 158). 
Appellant was then sentenced to a term of not more than 




THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUS-
TAIN THE LOWER COURT'S VERDICT OF 
GUILTY. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-38-12 (1953) states what ele-
ments are necessary for a person to be found guilty of re-
ceiving stolen property. 
"Every person who, for his own gain or to pre-
vent the owner from again possessing his property, 
buys or receives any personal property exceeding 
$50.00 in value, knowing the same to have been 
stolen, is punishable by imprisonment in the state 
prison not exceeding five years; if the value of the 
property so bought or received is $50 or less in 
value, he is guilty of a misdemeanor." 
Thus, there are three elements that have to be proven 
to find an accused guilty of receiving stolen property, to-
wit: 
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( 1) the accused must buy or receive the property; 
(2) the value must be in excess of $50.00 dollars; 
(3) the accused must know that the personal prop-
erty was stolen. 
The jury found the appellant guilty, but he contends that 
the evidence did not support the jury's verdict. Respondent 
submits that the evidence justifies the conviction. 
First there must be proof of an unlawful taking of 
personal property that was or is in the possession of the 
accused. 
"In any case, before the inference may be made 
from possession of stolen property alone, there must 
be proof of an unlawful taking, coupled with con-
vincing identification of the property stolen." Jen-
kins v. United States, 361 F. 2d 615 at 619 (10th 
Cir. 1966). 
No one disputes that the property was stolen. Four people 
testified in court that they had property stolen. Those 
same people also made positive identification that those 
items sold and given away by appellant were the same 
items that were burglarized from their homes (T. 4, 5, 16, 
23, 26, 32, 33) . Each burglary victim had some identifying 
mark establishing that particular item as their o-wn. 
All of these stolen goods, as testimony proves, were at 
one time or another in the hands of Buddy Washington. 
Testimony of Mr. Hall : 
"MR. STRATFORD: Well, that[ stolen rifles 
and polaroid camera] was in Shirley's home when 
you bought it, was it? 
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MR. HALL: No, no. 
MR. STRATFORD: You don't know if it was? 
MR. HALL: I don't know where it come from. 
I know he [Buddy Washington] brought it there. 
I don't know whether it come from Shirley's home" 
( T. 49) . (Emphasis added.) 
Testimony of Mrs. Hall : 
"MR. STRATFORD: Do you know whether or 
not most of them [stolen radio, rifles, polaroid cam-
era, and color television] had been in Mrs. Owens' 
home? 
MRS. HALL : I had never seen them before 
until he [Buddy Washington] brought them in" (T. 
59). (Emphasis added.) 
Shirley Owens' testimony: 
"MR. STRATFORD : Alright. Now then, can 
you tell us approximately - was it in the month 
of September or October that he [Buddy Washing-
ton] brought things [stolen goods] to your home? 
SHIRLEY OWENS: I would say he did, yes. 
MR. STRATFORD: He did? 
SHIRLEY OWENS: Well, I can't say he did. 
There was other people I didn't know there. 
MR. STRATFORD: Was he with them? 
SHIRLEY OWENS: Yeah, he was there. He 
is the only one I knew" ( T. 79) . 
The testimony of four individuals positively identify-
ing their stolen property, coupled with the testimony of 
three other persons stating appellant brought the same 
burglarized goods to them, should be ample proof that the 
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goods were stolen and that Buddy Washington had posses-
sion of them. In California, that is all that is required to 
convict a person for receiving stolen property. 
"In prosecution for receiving stolen goods, 
where there was evidence that defendant had re-
ceived the stolen property, evidence that he had 
paid anything for it was unnecessary, since the 
offense is committed when the person either buys 
or receives stolen property." People v. Smith, 26 
Cal. 2d 854, 161 P. 2d 941 at 942 (1945). 
The second element needed for a conviction is that the 
value of the goods must be in excess of $50.00. The follow-
ing items were stolen: a polaroid camera, new cost $225.00; 
black persian lamb jacket, new cost $550.00; black and 
white television set, present value $60.00; Westinghouse 
radio, new cost $7.97; hair dryer, new cost $23.97; color 
television set, new cost $400.00; pendant watch and antique 
gun (upon which no actual cost could be given). Total 
value of the above items when new was in excess of 
$1265.00. All these prices were testified to in court, yet 
counsel for appellant contends there was not proof enough 
to support this element of the crime. The respondent ack-
nowledges that some of the items were two years old, to-
wit: the color television and black persian lamb coat, but 
common sense tells us the price would still be way above 
$50.00. 
"While jurors are not permitted to speculate as 
to value of the stolen property in prosecution for 
receiving such they should be permitted to use com-
mon sense." State v. Grijalua, 8 Ariz. App. 205, 445 
· P. 2d 88 at 90 (1968). 
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back with a verdict finding the appellant guilty of receiv-
ing stolen property in excess of $50.00. 
As stated in State v. White, 107 Utah 84, 152 P. 2d 
88 (1944) : 
"In prosecution for rece1vmg stolen jewelry, 
testimony warranted finding that value of stolen 
property exceeded $50.00 and warranted refusal of 
defendant's motion to reduce charge from a felony 
to a misdemeanor." Id. at 89. 
The third element needed to prove appelJant guilty of 
the crime is that he knew the goods were stolen. 
The appellant, Buddy Washington, had items that 
when new were valued over $1265.00. Yet the total amount 
received for those items was $72.00. He sold a two year old 
color television set for $30.00 which cost $400.00 new. He 
sold a $225.00 polaroid camera set for $12.00. He gave 
away a $34.97 hair dryer, a $7.97 Westinghouse radio, and 
a $550.00 black persian lamb coat! As stated in People v. 
Reynolds, 149 Cal. 2d 290, 308 P. 2d 48 (1957). 
"Sale of property at a price disproportionately 
low compared to its value may be a suspicious cir-
cumstance justifying inference of knowledge that 
property was stolen." Id. at 51. 
Then when asked by Shirley Owens where he got all these 
items Washington refused to tell her (T. 70). However,; 
when questioned on the stand appellant had a readily avail-
able story - he explained he was selling the stolen items 
for a friend, Mr. Hussey. However, evidence was introduced 
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which impeached appellant's testimony by showing that 
stolen credit cards taken from Mr. Wade's home were in 
appellant's possession. Needless to say, there is a big ques-
tion as to where Washington would get the stolen credit 
cards when he was only selling the items at the request of 
Mr. Hussey. As stated in Findley v. United States, 362 F. 
2d 921 (9th Cir. 1966) : 
"Possession of property recently stolen if not 
satisfactorily explained, is circumstantial evidence 
from which a jury may properly infer and find that 
the person in possession had knowledge that the 
property had been stolen." Id. at 923. 
The same proposition was also stated in State v. 
Murphy, ______ Or. ______ , 455 P. 2d 178 (1969) : 
"Evidence, including defendant's explanation 
for possession which a jury was entitled to disbe-
lieve and from which guilty know ledge could be in-
ferred, was sufficient to warrant finding of knowl-
edge in prosecution for concealing stolen property." 
Id. at 179. 
Appellant knew the items he sold were stolen, that's 
why he sold or gave away $1265.00 worth of goods for 
$72.00, refused to tell anyone where he got the goods 
and then fabricated an explanation when the police ques-
tioned him. The jury realized this and found him guilty. 
As stated by this Court in State v. Roberts, 91 Utah 117, 
63 P. 2d 584 ( 1937). 
"The question of the credibility of the wit-
nesses is for the jury and, if there is competent 
. evidence upon which reasonable and unprejudicial 
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minds might draw different conclusions, the jury's 
findings will not be disturbed." Id. at 588. 
Based on the foregoing the state submits that there 
was sufficient evidence to convict the appellant of receiv-
ing stolen property having a value in excess of fifty dollars. 
POINT II. 
THE STATE'S WITNESSES WERE NOT AC-
COMPLICES TO MR. WASHINGTON AND NO 
INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY ON AN AC-
COMPLICE'S TESTIMONY WAS NECESSARY. 
Counsel for Mr. Washington raises on appeal the re-
fusal of the trial judge to instruct the jury on an accom-
plice's testimony. However, in the present case, the so 
called accomplices were witnesses for the state, and the 
appellant never sustained the burden of proving that these 
witnesses were accomplices. As stated in State v. Bixby, 
27 Wash. 2d 144, 177 P. 2d 689 (1947). 
"Whether a person is an accomplice depends on 
particular facts, and fact that one is an accomplice 
must be shown by proof and burden is on defendant 
to show that witness for the state is an accomplice." 
Id. at 702. (Emphasis added.) 
Respondent also contends that the so-called accomplices 
by case definition were not accomplices in this particular 
crime but simply witnesses for the state. 
"An 'accomplice' is one who is or could be 
charged as a principal with the defendant on trial." 
State v. Bowman, 92 Utah 540, 70 P. 2d 458 (1937); 
State v. Coroles, 74 Utah 94, 277 P. 203 (1929); 
State v. Cragun, 85 Utah 149, 38 P. 2d 1071 ( 1934). 
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Note that the accomplice must be charged as a principal 
with the defendant. Thus, in our case the state's witnesses 
must or could be, to qualify as accomplices to Washington, 
charged as receiving stolen goods with the defendant. At 
no point in the transcript is there any evidence of the so-
called accomplices helping Washington in receiving stolen 
property. They did not help him buy it, they did not help 
him receive it - they did nothing that could tie them in 
to his crime. They did buy and receive as gifts some items 
from appellant. However, they never aided, assisted nor 
participated with appellant in receiving the stolen property. 
Case law states that even if the state's witnesses were 
guilty of receiving stolen property, they would not be ac-
complices to appellant. Not one of them in any form helped 
Washington in receiving the stolen goods. Their alleged 
crime (if there was one) was completely different and 
separate from that of his, the only thing in common would 
be receiving the same stolen goods. Those witnesses simply 
had nothing to do with Buddy Washington's offense. This 
very point was brought out in State v. Bowman (supra 
pg. 11). 
"An 'accomplice' whose testimony needs corrob-
oration under statute is one who is culpably impli-
cated in commission of crime of which defendant 
is accused." Id. at 548. (Emphasis added.) 
The state's witnesses were not accomplices to the 
offense committed by appellant of receiving stolen prop-
erty in excess of $50.00 and on this basis no instruction 
was needed by the jury with regard to corroboration of 
accomplice's testimony. 
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POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AD-
MITTING EXHIBITS J, K, AND L. 
The trial court allowed into evidence Mr. Wade's credit 
cards (Exhibits J, K, and L) and Washington's receipts for 
the use of the credit cards, solely to impeach Mr. Washing-
ton. On this basis it is completely valid. 
3 Wigmore, Evidence § 890 at 380 (3rd Ed. 1940) 
states: 
"The law is that a defendant taking the stand 
as a witness may as a witness be impeached pre-
cisely like any other witness." (Emphasis added.) 
The cases support Wigmore. In Booth v. State, 76 Okla. Cr. 
410, 137 P. 2d 602 (1943), the Court said: 
"When the defendant chose to testify he became 
subject to the same rules of cross-examination and 
impeachment as other witnesses and in this connec-
tion it was perfectly proper for the county attorney 
to question him concerning prior convictions for the 
purpose of affecting his credibility." 
The trial judge was correct when he allowed the credit 
cards into evidence for impeachment purposes only. Courts 
have also held that specific acts (such as using stolen credit 
cards) can be brought into evidence. 
"Notwithstanding the general rule that a wit-
ness may not be impeached by evidence of specific 
acts of bad character, as distinguished from evi-
dence of general reputation for truth, honesty or 
integrity, evidence or particular wrongful acts may 
be admissible where the issue goes beyond general 
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reputation of a witness and involves truthfulness as 
to the basic fact in issue." State v. Hurlburt, 166 
Cal. App. 2d 334, 333 P. 2d 82 at 85 (1958). (Em-
phasis added.) 
Based on legal authority and cases cited, there is no 
doubt that Exhibits J, K, and L were legally and properly 
brought into evidence. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUS-
ING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON A LESSER 
OFFENSE. 
The appellant feels the jury should have been in-
structed on a lesser offense, i.e., that if the stolen goods 
were less than $50.00 Washington could only be convicted 
of a misdemeanor. The court failed to instruct the jury to 
a lesser offense for the very reason stated in a case used 
by appellant - the evidence failed to justify a verdict on 
a lesser offense, State v. ·valdez, 19 Utah 2d 426, 432 P. 2d 
53 (1967). The value of the goods stolen by appellant when 
new exceeded $1265.00. Among the goods stolen was a 
color television, a black and white television, and a black 
persian lamb coat. None were more than two years old. 
There was obviously more than $50.00 worth of goods and 
the judge did not deem it necessary to so instruct the jury. 
As stated by this Court in State v. Valdez, supra (see also 
appellant's brief, pg. 17) : 
"As a general rule the trial court should sub-
mit to the jury included offenses where the evidence 
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would justify such a verdict." Id. at 54. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The respondent submits that the trial judge followed 
established Utah Supreme Court rules in refusing to in-
struct the jury to a lesser offense (receiving stolen goods 
under $50.00) when it was obvious that evidence (had 
goods with value new in excess of $1265.00) supported the 
crime for which Washington was indicted. 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT SENTENCED APPEL-
LANT TO BEING AN HABITUAL CRIMINAL 
ACCORDING TO ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE 
AND UTAH LAW. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-10 ( 1953) reads: 
"Whoever has been previously twice convicted 
of felonies, sentenced and committed to any prison, 
shall, upon conviction of a felony committed in this 
state, other than murder in the first or second de-
gree, be deemed to be an habitual criminal, and 
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state 
prison for not less than fifteen years; provided, that 
if the person so convicted shall show to the satis-
faction of the court before which such conviction is 
had that he was released from imprisonment upon 
either of such sentences upon a pardon granted on 
the ground that he was innocent, such conviction 
and sentence shall not be considered as such under 
this section." 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
The statute is very precise, anyone convicted of two 
prior felonies, who is convicted for a third felony is an 
habitual criminal. Pursuant to that statute Mr. Stratford 
brought in Mr. James Johnson, records and identification 
officer at the Utah State Prison. Mr. Johnson brought Ex-
hibits 1 and 2 with him from the state prison. Mr. Johnson 
testified that these exhibits were copies of commitments 
on Buddy Washington, taken by him from his files at the 
Utah State Prison (T. 145; 146). Mr. Johnson testified 
that the originals of each commitment were kept in each 
prisoner's file at the prison by himself (T. 145, 146). Mr. 
Johnson also testiifed that he received appellant for im-
prisonment on one felony (T. 150) and produced a receipt 
from another officer who received Washington for another 
and earlier felony (T. 150). Those coupled with the present 
conviction is ample proof that Buddy Washington is an 
habitual criminal. Appellant attempts to question evidence 
(copies of the commitments) that was and is used daily to 
put and confine prisoners in the Utah State Prison. These 
are official state records and are admissible. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-25-3 ( 1953). 
Counsel for appellant raises objection to his being sen-
tenced for being both an habitual criminal and receiving 
stolen goods in excess of $50.00. He claims the court erred 
in sentencing appellant twice for a single offense. How-
ever, he cites Utah cases which state that being an habitual 
criminal is a status and is not being charged with a crime. 
(State v. Wood, 2 Utah 2d 34, 368 P. 2d 998 (1954)). If be-
ing an habitual criminal is a status and not a crime, it fol-
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lows that appellant was sentenced once for one crime and 
sentenced once for his status as an habitual criminal-which 
does not inflict further punishment for that crime. Appel-
lant was sentenced to 5 years for his crime of receiving 
stolen goods in excess of $50.00 and 15 years for his status 
as an habitual criminal. As stated in Zeimer v. Turner, 14 
Utah 2d 232, 381 P. 2d 721 (1962). 
"Being an habitual criminal is a status, and to 
be charged with being an habitual criminal is not 
to be charged with a crime. The habitual criminal 
statute will apply only upon a conviction of the 
criminal offense last charged. Its invocation does 
not inflict additional or further punishment for the 
prior conviction or impose a new punishment there-
for. It only serves to make more severe the punish-
ment for the last or subsequent offense which might 
be imposed because of the previous convictions." 
Id. at 723. (Emphasis added.) 
This is completely constitutional and valid under Utah 
Supreme Court decisions. Appellant committed a crime, 
and due to his previous convictions he is by status an 
habitual criminal. 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent respectfully submits that the lower 
court decision should be upheld. Appellant was given a 
fair and impartial trial. Through the evidence presented 
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and the testimony given, all of which were completely 
proper and justified, it is apparent that appellant was guilty 
of the crime as charged and was properly found to be in the 
status of an habitual criminal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
LAUREN N. BEASLEY 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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